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THE LAWYER AS PUBLIC FIGURE FOR 
FIRST AMENDMENT PURPOSES 
ALEX B. LONG* 
Abstract: Should lawyers be treated as public figures for purposes of defama-
tion claims and, therefore, be subjected to a higher evidentiary standard of ac-
tual malice under the Supreme Court’s decision in New York Times Co. v. Sul-
livan? The question of whether lawyers should be treated as public figures 
raises broad questions about the nature of defamation law and the legal pro-
fession.  By examining the Supreme Court’s defamation jurisprudence through 
the lens of cases involving lawyers as plaintiffs, one can see the deficiencies 
and inconsistencies in the Court’s opinions more clearly. And by examining 
the Court’s defamation cases through this lens, one can also see more clearly 
some of the complexities the legal profession now faces and its sometimes 
conflicting view of itself. 
INTRODUCTION 
“Reputation ought to be the perpetual subject of my thoughts, and aim 
of my behavior.” 
— John Adams1 
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court famously held 
that before a public official may recover damages in a defamation action, 
the public official must first prove actual malice on the part of the defend-
ant.2 Thus, to prevail, the public official must establish by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the defendant knew the defamatory statement was 
false or acted with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of the state-
ment.3 In later decisions, the Court explained that this same rule applied, 
not just to public officials but to public figures as well.4 
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 1 DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 46 (2001). 
 2 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964). 
 3 Id. at 279–80. 
 4 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 323 (1974); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 
U.S. 130, 132, 162 (1967). 
1544 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:1543 
Although the basic rule from New York Times is well established, it is 
widely acknowledged that the focus on whether an individual qualifies as a 
public figure often yields unpredictable results.5 
Consider the following hypothetical as an example of this problem: 
John is a relatively successful lawyer. He has been in practice for 
a few years, and, in that time, has tried several cases that generat-
ed significant publicity in his community. He is also active in 
state politics and community affairs. Not long ago, protestors 
were demonstrating against what they perceived to be abuse of 
power on the part of the executive branch when law enforcement 
arrived. Violence erupted, which led to the deaths of five of the 
original protestors. Several of the law enforcement officers were 
charged with murder. The trial judge appointed John as counsel 
for the officers because no other local lawyers were willing to 
take the case. As one might expect, the killings and the impending 
trial resulted in widespread publicity and public comment. John 
was attacked in the media for his representation of the officers. 
John eventually sued the local newspaper for defamation after it 
ran several stories containing false and defamatory statements 
about John’s actions while representing the officers. The newspa-
per moved for summary judgment on the grounds that John was a 
public figure and had failed to prove that the defendants had acted 
with actual malice as required under the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in New York Times. John argues that he is not a public figure 
and is therefore not required to establish actual malice. 
How should the court rule on the issue? On the one hand, John has 
achieved a certain amount of notoriety through his practice, seems to be a 
leader within his community and is involved in public affairs, and has 
agreed to represent clients in a high-profile case, knowing full well that his 
representation would invite public comment. On the other hand, one could 
argue that John is simply a lawyer doing his job and has not voluntarily 
thrust himself into the public spotlight. Should he be treated as a public fig-
ure for purposes of defamation analysis and thus have to meet the difficult 
burden of proving that the defendant acted with actual malice? 
                                                                                                                           
 5 See Marc A. Franklin, Constitutional Libel Law: The Role of Content, 34 UCLA L. REV. 
1657, 1657 (1987) (stating that by making the standard of protection for speech dependent on the 
status of the plaintiff, the Court has produced “anomalous and unpredictable results”); see also 
Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 1976), aff’d, 580 F.2d 859 
(5th Cir. 1978) (stating that “[d]efining public figures is much like trying to nail a jellyfish to the 
wall”). 
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“John” in this hypothetical is, of course, John Adams, and the scenario 
is based on Adams’ representation of the British soldiers facing charges af-
ter the Boston Massacre. The tale of Adams’ involvement in the case is one 
that members of the legal profession love to tell. Adams’ actions represent 
the best of what the legal profession likes to believe about itself, and Adams 
himself is sometimes held up as the example of an important ideal: the law-
yer as public citizen.6 
The idea that lawyers occupy a special role in society is strong in the 
literature about the legal profession.7 Lawyers are often described as leaders 
and public citizens who occupy special places of prominence within the 
community.8 Even if all lawyers do not occupy such positions, a quick 
glance at television, movies, literature, and news stories about the legal pro-
cess quickly confirms the reality that stories about lawyers and the legal 
                                                                                                                           
 6 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014) (describing a 
lawyer as “a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having 
special responsibility for the quality of justice”); Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., Chief Justict of up-
reme Court of Missouir, Chief Justice’s Address to Members of the Missouri Bar, September 13, 
2001, in 57 J. MO. B. 222, 225 (2001) (referencing the Boston Massacre case and referring to 
Adams as “the consummate lawyer as public citizen”). 
 7 See Debra Lyn Bassett, Redefining the “Public" Profession, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 721, 721–22 
(2005) (noting the repeated references in legal literature to the idea of the law as a “public” pro-
fession); Rick Hubbard, Restoring Citizen Representation in Our Democratic Republic, 40 VT. 
B.J. 20, 27 (2014) (referring to “the special role of the lawyer as a public servant”); Marcia S. 
Krieger, A Twenty-First Century Ethos for the Legal Profession: Why Bother?, 86 DENV. U.L. 
REV. 865, 867 (2009) (noting that “lawyers have a special role in the state as guardians of the 
legal order”); Deborah L. Rhode, Lawyers as Citizens, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1323, 1323–24 
(2009) (noting that “[a]lthough this nation may not have the world’s most developed sense of 
attorneys’ public responsibilities, it undoubtedly has the most extensive commentary on the sub-
ject”); Paula Schaefer, A Primer on Professionalism for Doctrinal Professors, 81 TENN. L. REV. 
277, 292 (2014) (discussing the concept of the ideal lawyer as being one who “embraces the spe-
cial role that lawyers play in the legal system and in society”). 
 8 See Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Brandt (In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Brand), 
766 N.W.2d 194, 202 (Wis. 2009) (noting that “[a]ttorneys are officers of the court and should be 
leaders in their communities and should set a good example for others”); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, 
THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 14–16 (1993) (discussing the 
idea of the “lawyer-statesman” who is a leader in the community); Kim M. Boyle, LSBA’s Role 
and Response in This Challenging Environment, 57 LA. B.J. 80, 80 (2009) (explaining that the 
Preamble to the American Bar Association (“ABA”) Model Rules of Professional Conduct pro-
vides an overview of professionalism for lawyers); Patrick G. Goetzinger & Robert L. Morris, 
Project Rural Practice: Its People & Its Purpose, 59 S.D. L. REV. 444, 445 (2014) (noting that 
“[r]ural attorneys were civic leaders regarded by their communities as much more than just anoth-
er lawyer”); Curtis M. Jensen, A Final Report and Farewell, UTAH B.J., July/Aug. 2014, at 8, 9 
(noting that “[a]s lawyers, we are the leaders in our communities”); Elizabeth Mary Kameen, 
Rethinking Zeal: Is It Zealous Representation or Zealotry?,  MD. B.J., Mar. 2011, at 5, 6 (discuss-
ing the role of lawyers as public citizens); Alan J. Lefebvre, Maybe Reparations Are Owed?, 22 
NEV. LAW. 4, 5 (2014) (referring to “[l]awyers’ rightful place as community and political lead-
ers”). See generally Susan Sturm, Law Schools, Leadership, and Change, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 
49 (2013), http://harvardlawreview.org/2013/12/law-schools-leadership-and-change/ [https://perma.
cc/P4SC-ECPW] (discussing the leadership roles that lawyers play in their communities).  
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profession still attract considerable attention from members of the public.9 
The public is increasingly accustomed to seeing lawyers assume celebrity or 
quasi-celebrity status in the course of representing clients in high-profile 
cases or by serving as legal commentators in such cases.10 Lawyers, by their 
nature, are sometimes litigious in their personal capacity and have frequent-
ly assumed the role of plaintiffs in numerous defamation cases against me-
dia defendants11 as well as occasionally against former clients,12 opposing 
counsel,13 and others.14 
Given these realities, it seems fair to ask whether the law should treat 
lawyers differently than other citizens when they bring defamation claims 
based on damage to their reputations. Should lawyers be treated as public 
figures for purposes of defamation claims and, therefore, be subjected to a 
higher evidentiary standard under the Supreme Court’s decision in New 
York Times? 
The question is not merely an academic one. As anyone who has stud-
ied defamation law knows, the resolution of the issue of whether a plaintiff 
qualifies as a public figure often can make or break the plaintiff’s case. 
There are numerous decisions involving lawyers as plaintiffs in defamation 
cases, yet the decisions are inconsistent in their approach to and resolution 
of the question of whether the lawyers in question qualify as public figures. 
While the law is clear that one does not become a public figure simply by 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See generally, e.g., JOHN GRISHAM, THE LITIGATORS (2011) (a legal thriller about an attor-
ney involved in a class action lawsuit); How to Get Away With Murder (ABC Studios 2015) (a 
television series that follows a criminal law professor and five of her students who are involved in 
a homicide investigation); Making a Murderer (Netflix 2015) (a documentary television series that 
follows the story of a man who spent eighteen years in prison for a wrongful conviction). 
 10 See Jessica Durando, ‘Making a Murderer’ Lawyers Dean Strang, Jerry Buting Are Inter-
net Stars, USA TODAY (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/life/nation-now/2016/01/
10/making-a-murderer-lawyers-dean-strang-jerry-buting-internet-heartthrobs/78583710/ [https://
perma.cc/6B3Y-UNAK]. 
 11 E.g., Cochran v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (C.D.Cal. 1998), aff’d 210 F.3d 
1036 (9th Cir. 2000) (involving an action in which criminal defense attorney Johnnie Cochran 
brought libel suit against the New York Post). 
 12 E.g., Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734 (2005) (involving an action in which criminal defense 
attorney Johnnie Cochran brought a state-law defamation suit against a former client). 
 13 E.g., Arneja v. Gildar, 541 A.2d 621 (D.C. 1988) (involving an action in which a tenant’s 
attorney brought a slander suit against a landlord’s attorney); Owen v. Carr, 478 N.E.2d 658, 660 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1985), aff’d, 497 N.E.2d 1145 (Ill. 1986) (involving an action in which an attorney 
brought a defamation suit against opposing counsel). 
 14 E.g., Ratner v. Young, 465 F. Supp. 386 (D.V.I. 1979) (involving a lawsuit against, inter 
alia, a state trial court judge who had written a defamatory letter about lawyer that was published 
in newspaper). 
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applying for admission to the bar,15 there are relatively few clear standards 
beyond that.16 
The question of whether lawyers should be treated as public figures al-
so raises broader questions about the nature of defamation law and the legal 
profession. By examining the Supreme Court’s defamation jurisprudence 
through the lens of cases involving lawyers as plaintiffs, one can see the 
deficiencies and inconsistencies in the Court’s opinions more clearly. 
Through this lens, one can also see more clearly some of the complexities 
the legal profession now faces and the sometimes uncertain nature of its 
role. 
This article explores the extent to which lawyers should be treated as 
public figures for purposes of defamation claims. Along the way, it attempts 
to raise broader issues concerning conceptions of the legal profession and 
the Supreme Court’s confusing approach to determining public figure sta-
tus. Part I begins by reviewing the Supreme Court’s defamation decisions 
and the evolution of the concept of a “public figure” beginning with New 
York Times.17 Part II examines how lower courts have applied the Supreme 
Court’s holdings involving public figures to defamation cases involving 
lawyers as plaintiffs.18 Part III uses defamation cases involving lawyers to 
illustrate the shortcomings of the Court’s approach.19 Finally, Part IV con-
cludes by offering some guidelines for courts to use when considering law-
yer defamation cases that would advance the public’s strong interest in dis-
cussing the legal process while remaining faithful to the principles that un-
derlie the Supreme Court’s defamation decisions.20 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE FIGURE DISTINCTION 
The question of the extent to which lawyers are truly public figures 
may take on special relevance in the context of defamation lawsuits. As a 
matter of constitutional law, public officials and public figures must satisfy 
a more demanding standard than private figures in order to establish a prima 
facie case of defamation. Despite over fifty years of decisional law, howev-
er, it is often difficult to predict how a court will resolve the question of 
                                                                                                                           
 15 See Dodrill v. Ark. Democrat Co., 590 S.W.2d 840, 844 (Ark. 1979); see also Marchiondo 
v. Brown, 649 P.2d 462, 467 (N.M. 1982) (“Generally, lawyers, in pursuing their profession, are 
not public figures . . . .”). 
 16 According to one author, “courts more often than not have held that attorneys are public 
figures when they become defamation plaintiffs.” RODNEY A. SMOLLA, THE LAW OF DEFAMA-
TION § 2:75 (2d ed. 2015). 
 17 See infra notes 21–88 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 89–187 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 188–333 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 334–380 and accompanying text. 
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whether a defamation plaintiff qualifies as a public figure or a private fig-
ure. Nowhere is the outcome of that question more difficult to predict than 
in the case of lawyers. 
A. Defamation Law’s Treatment of Public Figures 
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that, as a 
matter of constitutional law, a public official pursuing a defamation claim 
must establish actual malice on the part of the defendant.21 A defendant acts 
with “actual malice” in this context when the defendant knows the defama-
tory communication is false or acts with reckless disregard as to the state-
ment’s truth or falsity.22 Eventually, the Supreme Court expanded its hold-
ing to public figures as well as public officials.23 
As a result of the demanding proof structure that public figures face, 
defamation plaintiffs typically resist, when possible, defendants’ attempts to 
classify them as public figures.24 As explained by the Supreme Court, actual 
malice exists only where the defendant subjectively entertained serious 
doubts about the veracity of the defamatory statement.25 In contrast, private-
figure defamation plaintiffs are not required as a constitutional matter to es-
tablish actual malice on the part of a defendant. Instead, they ordinarily must 
only establish negligence on the part of a defendant and, in some states, can 
establish a prima facie case in the absence of any degree of fault on the part 
of the defendant.26 Given the obvious proof problems a plaintiff faces in satis-
fying the actual malice standard, many defamation cases are won or lost on 
the question of whether a plaintiff qualifies as a public figure. 
B. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.: The Distinction Between Public  
and Private Figures 
In 1974, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court fa-
mously explicated the concept of a public figure in defamation actions.27 In 
Gertz, the Court explained the distinctions between public figures and pri-
vate figures that it saw as justifying different proof structures in defamation 
actions.28 The decision also famously drew distinctions between different 
                                                                                                                           
 21 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
 22 Id. 
 23 See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). 
 24 But see Cochran v. Tory, 2003 WL 22451378, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2003), vacated, 
544 U.S. 734 (2005) (noting that attorney Johnnie Cochran “willingly conced[ed]” that he was a 
public figure for purposes of this defamation action). 
 25 St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). 
 26 SMOLLA, supra note 16, § 3:30. 
 27 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 323–24 (1974). 
 28 See id. at 352. 
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types of public figures.29 Thus, an understanding of Gertz is essential for 
purposes of understanding defamation law. Further, because Gertz involved 
a lawyer as the plaintiff, the decision is also essential for purposes of under-
standing how lawyers should be classified for defamation actions. 
Elmer Gertz was a lawyer who had been retained by the family of a 
youth who had been shot and killed by a police officer to represent the family 
in a civil action against the police officer.30 In addition to the civil lawsuit, the 
shooting resulted in criminal charges against the police officer.31 As part of 
his representation of the family, Gertz attended the coroner’s inquest into the 
death of the youth.32 The defendant published a monthly magazine, which ran 
an article alleging a conspiracy by communists to frame the police officer.33 
The article alleged among things that Gertz was a Marxist who was one of the 
architects of the supposed conspiracy.34 
Gertz sued for libel.35 The main issue facing the Supreme Court was 
the applicability of the New York Times actual malice standard to the case.36 
This necessarily required a determination as to whether Gertz qualified as a 
public figure.37 In considering the issue, the majority articulated two justifi-
cations for why public figures face the heightened burden of establishing 
actual malice.38 First is the self-help rationale.39 Public officials and public 
figures “usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effec-
tive communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counter-
act false statements than private individuals normally enjoy.”40 Because 
private figures usually lack such access, they are more susceptible to injury, 
and the state therefore has a greater interest in protecting them.41 The sec-
ond and “[m]ore important” justification involves assumption of risk prin-
ciples.42 By voluntarily “thrust[ing] themselves to the forefront of particular 
public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues in-
volved,” public figures assume a risk of heightened attention and com-
ment.43 
                                                                                                                           
 29 See id. at 342–48. 
 30 Id. at 325. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. at 326. 
 33 Id. at 325. 
 34 Id. at 326. 
 35 Id. at 323. 
 36 Id. at 332–33. 
 37 See id. at 323, 351–52. 
 38 Id. at 344. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 345. 
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The Court then outlined two categories of public figures.44 The first is 
the all-purpose or general-purpose public figure.45 These are individuals 
who have achieved “such pervasive fame or notoriety that [they] become[] 
a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts.”46 In subsequent cases, 
the Court would explain that this was a narrow category, reserved for a 
small group of individuals who had essentially become household names.47 
Turning to the facts of Gertz’s case, the Court noted that Gertz had “long 
been active in community and professional affairs,” had “served as an of-
ficer of local civic groups and of various professional organizations, and 
[had] published several books and articles on legal subjects.”48 While con-
ceding that Gertz was “well known in some circles,” the Court did not view 
Gertz as having attained “general fame or notoriety in the community,” as 
evidenced by the fact that none of the prospective jurors in the case had ev-
er heard of Gertz.49 The Court expressed a hesitation to classify an individ-
ual as an all-purpose or general-purpose public figure based simply on the 
individual’s participation in community and professional affairs.50 Instead, 
the Court thought it preferable to focus on “the nature and extent of an indi-
vidual’s participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defama-
tion.”51 
This more narrow focus effectively defines the second category of 
public figures, which includes one who “voluntarily injects himself or is 
drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public 
figure for a limited range of issues.”52 The Court concluded that Gertz did 
not qualify as a public figure for purposes of the defamatory statements 
concerning his involvement in the supposed framing of the police officer in 
the underlying case. Gertz “played a minimal role at the coroner’s inquest” 
and his involvement was simply that of a lawyer representing a private cli-
ent,53 not that of a “de facto public official.”54 Nor did Gertz ever discuss 
the criminal or civil litigation with the press.55 In short, Gertz “plainly did 
not thrust himself into the vortex of this public issue, nor did he engage the 
                                                                                                                           
 44 Id. at 351. 
 45 See id. 
 46 Id.  
 47 See, e.g., Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 165 (1979) (“A libel de-
fendant must show more than mere newsworthiness to justify the application of the demanding 
burden of New York Times.”). 
 48 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351. 
 49 See id. at 351–52. 
 50 See id. at 352. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 351. 
 53 Id. at 352. 
 54 Id. at 351. 
 55 Id. at 352. 
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public’s attention in an attempt to influence its outcome.”56 As such, he was 
not a limited-purpose public figure and was instead best viewed as a private 
figure.57 
Gertz also left open the possibility of a third category of public figures: 
the involuntary public figure.58 The Gertz Court’s conception of public offi-
cials and public figures is grounded in the notion that such individuals vol-
untarily enter the public fray.59 The majority also recognized that “[h]ypo-
thetically, it may be possible for someone to become a public figure through 
no purposeful action of his own.”60 The Court left open the possibility that 
some individuals might become public figures without voluntarily injecting 
themselves into the spotlight and perhaps through sheer bad luck, while also 
cautioning that “instances of truly involuntary public figures must be ex-
ceedingly rare.”61 
Although there remains considerable disagreement on the issues of 
how to define the concept of an involuntary public figure and the continuing 
viability of that category,62 at least some courts have held that an involun-
tary public figure may be required to establish actual malice when pursuing 
defamation claims.63 Relying on Gertz’s assumption of risk justification, 
most courts that have categorized an individual as an involuntary public 
figure have done so on the grounds that the individual, through his actions, 
assumed the risk of resulting publicity and became a central figure in a pub-
lic controversy.64 As explained by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit, to qualify as an involuntary public figure, the plaintiff must be a 
central figure in a public controversy and have “taken some action, or failed 
to act when action was required, in circumstances in which a reasonable 
person would understand that publicity would likely inhere.”65 
                                                                                                                           
 56 Id. 
 57 See id. 
 58 See id. at 345. 
 59 See id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id.; see Dameron v. Wash. Magazine, Inc., 779 F.2d 736, 742–43 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (con-
cluding that plaintiff had become a public figure through “sheer bad luck” of becoming a promi-
nent figure in a public controversy). 
 62 See Joseph H. King, Jr., Deus ex Machina and the Unfulfilled Promise of New York Times 
v. Sullivan: Applying the Times for All Seasons, 95 KY. L.J. 649, 673–94 (2007) (noting that some 
“suggest that the involuntary public figure subcategory is becoming a dead letter or is heading in 
that direction” and discussing the different approaches to defining the category). 
 63 See, e.g., Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175, 186–87 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2001). 
 64 See, e.g., Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 539–40 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 65 Id. at 540. 
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C. Time, Inc. v. Firestone and Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc.:  
A Narrow View of the Public Figure 
In the two other cases to address the issue of whether a plaintiff was a 
public figure, the Supreme Court again took a narrow view of the public 
figure concept.66 
In 1976, in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, the U.S. Supreme Court presided 
over a case in which the defendant published an inaccurate and defamatory 
account of the plaintiff’s divorce proceedings.67 When the plaintiff sued, the 
defendant argued that the plaintiff was a public figure and the New York 
Times actual malice standard should therefore apply.68 The plaintiff, the 
wife of “the scion of one of America’s wealthier industrial families,” had 
filed the divorce action.69 The defendant reasoned that since the case be-
came a “cause célèbre,” the matter was a public controversy and the plain-
tiff was, therefore, a limited-purpose public figure.70 The Court resolved the 
issue on the grounds that the divorce action was not the type of public con-
troversy envisioned by Gertz even though it may have been of interest to 
the public.71 According to the Court, the fact that a controversy is of interest 
to the public does not mean that there is a “public controversy.”72 
Although ostensibly limited to the issue of whether a public controver-
sy existed, this portion of the opinion also touches on issues relevant to the 
limited-public figure analysis. As in Gertz, the Court noted that the plaintiff 
had not publicized her position.73 In addition, the Court questioned the vol-
untariness of her action in filing for divorce, noting that she “was compelled 
to go to court by the State in order to obtain legal release from the bonds of 
matrimony.”74 
In 1979, in Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., the Supreme Court 
once again refused to classify an individual as a public figure.75 The plain-
tiff in Wolston had pleaded guilty to contempt of court charges after failing 
to appear before a grand jury investigating espionage charges involving So-
viet intelligence agents in the United States.76 These events resulted in a 
certain amount of media coverage. Over fifteen years later, the defendant 
                                                                                                                           
 66 See Wolston, 443 U.S. at 158; Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 448 (1976). 
 67 Time, Inc., 424 U.S. at 448. 
 68 Id. at 452–53. 
 69 Id. at 450. 
 70 Id. at 454. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 See Wolston, 443 U.S. at 158. 
 76 Id. at 162–63. 
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published a book discussing Soviet espionage activities and listed the plain-
tiff as a Soviet agent.77 The plaintiff, Wolston, sued for defamation. 
The main issue before the Court was Wolston’s public figure status. 
The Court first rejected the idea that Wolston became a public figure simply 
because his actions attracted media attention: “A private individual is not 
automatically transformed into a public figure just by becoming involved in 
or associated with a matter that attracts public attention.”78 Next, the Court 
rejected the idea that Wolston had “engaged the attention of the public in an 
attempt to influence the resolution of the issues involved.”79 Here, the Court 
pointed to two factors. First, Wolston had not attained any “special promi-
nence in the resolution of public questions.”80 Second, Wolston’s “failure to 
respond to the grand jury’s subpoena was in no way calculated to draw at-
tention to himself in order to invite public comment or influence the public 
with respect to any issue.”81 The Court suggested it would have been a dif-
ferent matter if Wolston had invited the contempt citation “in order to use 
the contempt citation as a fulcrum to create public discussion about the 
methods being used in connection with an investigation or prosecution.”82 
As it was, nothing about Wolston’s actions suggested that he was seeking to 
arouse public sentiment in his favor on these issues.83 Finally, the Court 
rejected the notion that Wolston should be classified as a public figure by 
virtue of having engaged in criminal conduct.84 In so doing, the Court ex-
pressed a reluctance to classify participants in litigation as public figures. 
Although it acknowledged that some litigants might be public figures, the 
Court opined that the majority of litigants do not enter the public forum of 
trial voluntarily. Instead, they are brought into the forum involuntarily, ei-
ther in an attempt to obtain the only legal remedies made available by the 
State or in order to defend themselves against charges.85 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice  Marshall, 
criticized the majority for what they viewed as an overly-restrictive ap-
proach to the issue of public-figure status.86 According to Justice Blackmun 
and Justice Marshall, the majority placed excessive emphasis on the need 
for the plaintiff to attempt to influence public discussion.87 Thus, the major-
                                                                                                                           
 77 Id. at 159. 
 78 Id. at 167. 
 79 Id. at 168. 
 80 Id. (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351). 
 81 Wolston, 443 U.S. at 168. 
 82 See id. 
 83 See id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 168–69. 
 86 Id. at 170 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 87 Id. at 169. 
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ity had seemingly concluded that an individual becomes a limited-purpose 
public figure “only if he literally or figuratively ‘mounts a rostrum’ to advo-
cate a particular view.”88 
II. LAWYERS AS PUBLIC FIGURES/PRIVATE FIGURES 
Gertz and its progeny establish the framework for lower courts charged 
with determining the public-figure status of defamation plaintiffs. In the 
case of lawyers as defamation plaintiffs, at least, the framework has not 
produced consistent results. As the following section describes, lower 
courts have not only reached conflicting results in comparable cases on the 
issue, they have also been unable to agree as to the relevance of certain ac-
tions on the part of lawyers in making the determination. 
A. Lawyers as General/All-Purpose Public Figures 
Relatively few lawyers are likely to achieve the type of pervasive fame 
and notoriety necessary to qualify as all-purpose public figures.89 Perhaps 
Clarence Darrow in his day90 or Johnnie Cochran91 from the more recent 
past might have met this threshold on a national level, but few lawyers ever 
become household names on a national level. One lawyer who did is famed 
radical lawyer William Kunstler. 
Kunstler is one of the best examples of a cause lawyer, a lawyer who 
“choose[s] clients and cases in order to pursue their own ideological . . . 
projects.”92 Kunstler became famous over the course of his career for his 
representation of clients in some of the most high profile cases of the time, 
including Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the Chicago Seven, and Jack Ruby.93 
Kunstler garnered significant publicity for his representation of the Chicago 
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 89 See generally Spence v. Flynt, 816 P.2d 771, 777 (Wyo. 1991) (opining that famed lawyer 
Gerry Spence might only be a public figure for some purposes despite his concession that he was a 
public figure). 
 90 See infra note 275 and accompanying text. 
 91 See Gerald F. Uelmen, Who Is the Lawyer of the Century?, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 613, 625 
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v. Tory, 2003 WL 22451378, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 29, 2003), vacated, 544 U.S. 734 (2005). 
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SOC. INQUIRY 657, 659 (2004); see also Judith A. McMorrow & Luke M. Scheuer, The Moral 
Responsibility of the Corporate Lawyer, 60 CATH. U.L. REV. 275, 298–99 (2011) (identifying 
Kunstler as a cause lawyer). 
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Seven and his unorthodox trial demeanor.94 Kunstler’s fame was so substan-
tial that during a riot, the rioters supposedly shouted, “Give us Kunstler! We 
want Kunstler!”95 At the time of his death, the London Times referred to 
Kunstler as “the most celebrated and detested lawyer in America.”96 
In the early 1970s, Kunstler sued a state judge for making defamatory 
statements concerning Kunstler in a letter that was published in a newspa-
per.97 Not surprisingly, Kunstler was held to be a general or all-purpose 
public figure.98 In reaching its decision, the court referenced the fact that 
Kunstler “defended many of the leaders in the revolt of the 1960’s and early 
1970’s seeking to get rid of the ‘establishment,’” that Kunstler “was almost 
always on the unpopular side of controversial cases,” and that “[h]is cases 
and trial tactics were widely publicized.”99 Indeed, Kunstler’s own lawyer 
was forced to acknowledge during oral argument that Kunstler was “a con-
troversial figure on a national scale.”100 
In some respects, William Kunstler and Elmer Gertz were quite simi-
lar. Both devoted significant energy to representing unpopular individuals 
and both achieved some acclaim in the process.101  What distinguishes the 
two lawyers most clearly, however, is the notoriety they attained and how 
they attained it. Whereas Kunstler was “one of the leading lawyers in the 
country”102 and was controversial on a national scale, Gertz “had achieved 
no general fame or notoriety within the community.”103 Although Kunstler 
                                                                                                                           
 94 See DAVID J. LANGUM, WILLIAM M. KUNSTLER: THE MOST HATED LAWYER IN AMERICA 
84, 99, 216 (1999) (discussing media coverage in Life magazine, New York Times, and Playboy). 
 95 Id. at 208. 
 96 Id. at 1 (quoting London Times). 
 97 Ratner v. Young, 465 F. Supp. 386, 388 (D.V.I. 1979). 
 98 Id. at 399–400. 
 99 Id. at 399.  
 100 Id. at 400. One of the more interesting aspects of the Ratner decision is the almost palpa-
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concluding that Kunstler is a public figure and therefore must satisfy the demanding actual malice 
standard. 
 101 Arguably, Elmer Gertz met the definition of a cause lawyer. Throughout his career, Gertz 
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of the company that published Arthur Miller’s Tropic of Cancer, which had allegedly been cen-
sored for being obscene. ELMER GERTZ, A HANDFUL OF CLIENTS 229 (1965). He represented 
murderer Nathan Leopold (of Leopold and Loeb fame), whose murder trial had been a cause célè-
bre of the American left. Id. at 3–6. He also had multiple clients in civil rights actions. According 
to his autobiography, Gertz “bec[a]me famous in his own right through his celebrated work for 
[his clients] and his struggles over the decades for civil liberties and personal rights.” ELMER 
GERTZ, TO LIFE: THE STORY OF A CHICAGO LAWYER, at back cover (1974). 
 102 Ratner, 465 F. Supp. at 399. 
 103 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351–52 (1974). This point is actually debatable. 
By his own admission, Gertz had “appeared frequently” on television and radio and stated at the 
time, “There has never been a period in my mature life when I haven’t made public appearances of 
some kind.” Brief of Respondent on Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit at 1–2, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1973) (No. 72-617), 1973 WL 
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denied that appearing in the public spotlight was his “whole raison d’être,”104 
he actively sought the spotlight to the point that he became one of the most 
famous and controversial lawyers of all time.105 
While few lawyers attain the level of national notoriety enjoyed by 
William Kunstler, some may become general public figures on a more local 
level.106 For example, Myron Steere was a court-appointed lawyer in a 
highly publicized murder trial in Kansas.107 After a local radio station ran a 
defamatory story involving Steere’s representation in the murder case, 
Steere sued.108 From the court’s description of him, Steere embodies the 
ideal of a lawyer as a public citizen.109 Although the murder case generated 
significant publicity, Steere was already well known to the public prior to 
the trial.110 He had practiced law in his local community for thirty-two 
years, had previously served eight years as county attorney, had “served as 
special counsel for the board of county commissioners in a controversial 
dispute over the construction of a new courthouse,” and “was a prominent 
participant in numerous social activities and served as an officer and repre-
sentative for many professional, fraternal and social activities.”111 To the 
court, Steere had assumed a role of such special prominence within his 
community that he qualified as an all-purpose public figure.112 
B. Lawyers as Limited-Purpose Public Figures 
Because few lawyers become household names, courts are more likely 
to classify lawyers as limited-purpose public figures than all-purpose public 
figures.113 In some cases, courts have suggested that a lawyer might be a 
limited-purpose public figure with respect to controversies related to the 
                                                                                                                           
172732, at *1–2. Gertz also attained at least some level of fame through his representation of high-
profile clients. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. In Gertz’s brief, Gertz downplayed his 
involvement in public activities, stating “he had been involved in no public activities for a considera-
ble period of time prior to the publication of the article in question.” Reply Brief of Petitioner on Writ 
of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit at 2, Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1973) (No. 72-617), 1973 WL 172733, at *2. 
 104 See Stout, supra note 93. 
 105 See supra notes 92–100 and accompanying text. 
 106 See DeCarvalho v. daSilva, 414 A.2d 806, 813 (R.I. 1980) (concluding that a lawyer was a 
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 107 See Steere v. Cupp, 602 P.2d 1267, 1271, 1273 (Kan. 1979). 
 108 See id. at 1269. 
 109 See id. at 1273. 
 110 See id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 See Della-Donna v. Gore Newspapers Co., 489 So. 2d 72, 77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); 
Griffin v. Delta Democrat Times Publ’g Co., 815 So. 2d 1246, 1248 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). 
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lawyer’s professional activities but not with respect to other controversies 
involving the lawyer.114 In addition to the overall level of notoriety a lawyer 
has attained, courts may take into account the fact that the lawyer represents 
a high-profile client, the extent of the lawyer’s interaction with the media, 
the lawyer’s status as a community leader, and other relevant considerations 
in determining whether a lawyer qualifies as a public figure. 
1. Attaining Public Figure Status Through the Representation of High-
Profile Clients  
Perhaps the most common type of case involving lawyers as defama-
tion plaintiffs involves the lawyer who represents a notorious client or a 
client in a high-profile case.115 Here, Gertz obviously casts a long shad-
ow.116 Indeed, one could argue that Gertz actually fits this fact pattern.117 As 
the lead lawyer for the victim’s family in a controversial civil suit designed 
to establish fault on the part of the police, Elmer Gertz could easily have 
been deemed to have thrust himself to the forefront of a public controversy 
in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.118 Indeed, de-
fense counsel in Gertz argued that Gertz had “voluntarily entered the fray of 
public discussion on a controversial issue when he undertook to be counsel 
for the Nelsons at the coroner’s inquest” in an attempt to guide public poli-
cy.119 Nonetheless, the Court concluded that Gertz “plainly did not thrust 
himself into the vortex of this public issue.”120 Thus, Gertz potentially poses 
a problem for defamation defendants seeking to classify a lawyer who has 
represented a client in a high-profile case as a public figure.121 
Relying upon Gertz, a number of courts have since adopted a general 
rule that a lawyer’s representation of a notorious client or a client in a high-
profile matter does not, by itself, render the lawyer a public figure.122 This 
                                                                                                                           
 114 Durham v. Cannan Commc’ns, Inc., 645 S.W.2d 845, 851 (Tex. App. 1982). 
 115 See Marcone v. Penthouse Int’l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1085–86 (3d Cir. 
1985); Spence, 816 P.2d at 777. 
 116 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352. 
 117 See id. 
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selves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the 
issues involved”). 
 119 Brief of Respondent, supra note 103, at 9. 
 120 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352. 
 121 See id. 
 122 Marcone, 754 F.2d at 1085-86; Steere, 602 P.2d at 1274; Spence, 816 P.2d at 777; see also 
Doe No. 1. v. Burke, 91 A.3d 1031, 1043 (D.C. Ct. App. 2014); Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 
266 N.W.2d 693, 696 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (concluding that being appointed counsel in a crimi-
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Tribune Co., 804 P.2d 393, 395 (Mont. 1991) (citing Gertz in support of the rule); O’Neil v. Peek-
skill Faculty Ass’n, 507 N.Y.S.2d 173, 179 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (“Mere representation of a 
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is true even if the lawyer in question had achieved some measure of fame 
prior to the representation.123 Thus, for example, mere representation of a 
public entity does not transform a lawyer into a limited-purpose public fig-
ure under the general approach.124 The rule applies to appointed counsel as 
well as lawyers who voluntarily represent high-profile clients.125 Indeed, in 
one case, the court actually likened the plaintiff-attorney to Elmer Gertz, 
stating that the plaintiff was “a well-known attorney, although certainly not 
a celebrity” and “the trial court’s sole basis for holding that he was a public 
figure was the fact that he was appointed to handle a criminal appeal.”126 
This fact, however, was insufficient to confer limited-public figure status.127 
Aside from referencing Gertz, courts that have adopted the general rule 
have often done so on the grounds of ensuring access to justice. As ex-
plained by the Wyoming Supreme Court: “To hold otherwise would have a 
chilling effect upon attorneys who undertake to represent clients in difficult, 
unpopular, high profile, or sensational types of cases.”128 This, in turn, 
might make it more difficult for such clients to obtain skilled counsel.129 
Despite this commonly-stated rule, there are perhaps an equal number 
of decisions finding individual lawyers to be limited purpose public figures 
based, solely or at least in substantial part, on their representation of a noto-
rious client or a client in a high-profile matter.130 For example, Schwartz v. 
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 124 See O’Neil, 507 N.Y.S.2 at 179. 
 125 See Peisner, 266 N.W.2d at 696. 
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 128 Spence, 816 P.2d at 776–77; see also Marcone, 754 F.2d at 1085–86 (explaining that a 
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 129 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 355 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“The important public policy which 
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action.”); Spence, 816 P.2d at 777 (“We can foresee also detriment to these potential clients being 
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 130 See infra notes 131–138 and accompanying text; see also Ratner, 465 F. Supp. at 400 
(relying heavily on the fact that plaintiff volunteered to represent criminal defendant for free in 
concluding that she was a limited-purpose public figure); Weingarten v. Block, 162 Cal. Rptr. 
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Worrall Publications, Inc., a case from New Jersey, involved an attorney, 
Schwartz, who had previously served as the attorney for a local school dis-
trict and as president of the New Jersey School Boards Association.131 He 
then served as attorney for the Association as part of a government inquiry 
into the Association’s finances.132 During the representation, a local news-
paper falsely reported that Schwartz was himself the focus of the investiga-
tion.133 A New Jersey appellate court concluded that Schwartz was a public 
figure for purposes of his defamation claim against the paper.134 In reaching 
its conclusion, the court noted Schwartz’s long involvement with the state 
education system and stated that, as the attorney for the Association, 
“Schwartz voluntarily assumed a particularly visible position in the fore-
front of a very public issue. In that position, he invited and received com-
ment and attention.”135 
Schwartz is not an outlier. In one case, the only reason given for the 
conclusion that a lawyer was a limited-purpose public figure was that the 
lawyer represented a county board of supervisors.136 In another, a lawyer 
who volunteered to represent a group of white supremacists was found to be 
a public figure because, by virtue of his representation, he had voluntarily 
injected himself into public controversies concerning the group.137 In anoth-
er, the court concluded that a lawyer qualified as a limited-purpose public 
figure when he voluntarily injected himself into the matter of public contro-
versy when he “initiated a series of purposeful, considered actions, igniting 
a public controversy in which he continued to play a prominent role.”138 
The only “purposeful, considered actions” identified in the decision, how-
ever, were the attorney’s acts of serving as a trustee for a client and negoti-
ating and litigating on behalf of that client against an adverse party in a case 
that attracted significant local media attention.139 In other words, the sole 
basis for the court’s conclusion appears to have been the fact that the lawyer 
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public figure, in part, on the basis that he represented a governmental agency that had received 
significant public attention). 
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did his job on behalf of a notorious client.140 The fact that the lawyer “was 
motivated by fiduciary obligations or ethical responsibilities” was irrelevant 
to the question of whether he was a public figure.141 
Although courts have generally refrained from classifying a lawyer 
who represents a notorious client as an involuntary public figure, in at least 
one case, this seems like the most apt description of the lawyer in question. 
Bandelin v. Pietsch, a 1977 Idaho case, involved a lawyer who had been 
appointed by a court to serve as guardian for an incompetent individual and 
her estate.142 Thus, as a court-appointed attorney, the lawyer did not even 
voluntarily assume a prominent role in the matter in the same way that a 
lawyer who seeks out or willingly agrees to represent a notorious client. As 
a result of his alleged mishandling of the case, the judge ordered the lawyer 
to be held in contempt.143 The local newspaper ran multiple stories about 
the matter, two of which contained defamatory statements about the law-
yer.144  
In classifying the lawyer as a limited-purpose public figure, the Idaho 
Supreme Court made note of the fact that the lawyer had previously 
achieved notoriety within the county based on his civic and professional 
activities. The court, however, was explicit that this was not the exclusive 
reason for its conclusion that the lawyer was a public figure and instead 
chose to make the determination by examining the nature of the lawyer’s 
involvement in the matter that led to the defamatory publications.145 The 
court relied upon Gertz’s observation that that the limited-purpose public 
figure determination should focus on “the nature and extent of an individu-
al’s participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defama-
tion.”146 According to the court, as the court-appointed guardian of the es-
tate, the lawyer “was the center of the controversy that gave rise to the [de-
famatory] publications” and was “a pivotal figure in the controversy regard-
ing the accounting of the estate that gave rise to the defamation.”147 As 
such, the court concluded he was a public figure who had to establish actual 
malice on the part of the newspaper.148 In the court’s view, the fact that the 
lawyer did not seek the limelight was not determinative insofar as the actual 
malice standard “is based upon a value judgment that debate on public is-
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sues should be uninhibited.”149 The court stated, “[t]hat judgment is appli-
cable to both the individual who becomes embroiled in a public controversy 
through no effort of his own and the individual who actively generates con-
troversy—both abdicate their anonymity.”150 
In some respects, these decisions are in tension with Gertz. The Gertz 
Court was unwilling to conclude that voluntary representation in a high-
profile matter justifies conferring public-figure status upon a lawyer. Yet, de-
cisions like Schwartz seem to be premised in large part on such action. Ban-
delin takes a step further in this regard and concludes that public-figure status 
may result from court-appointed representation in a case that results in public 
attention. At the same time, the decisions are consistent with the notion that 
one becomes a limited-purpose public figure when one voluntarily thrusts 
himself to the center of a public controversy in order to influence the resolu-
tion of that controversy. That is, after all, what a litigator gets paid to do. As-
suming that there is some way that these conflicting decisions can be recon-
ciled, there remains a broader normative question: should a lawyer who rep-
resents a client in a high-profile case and who is then subsequently defamed 
be treated as a public figure for purposes of a resulting defamation claim? 
2. Attaining Public Figure Status Through Participation in Community 
Affairs 
Another potentially relevant consideration in the public figure analysis 
is the extent of a lawyer’s participation in community affairs. In Gertz, 
Elmer Gertz had “long been active in community and professional affairs” 
and had “served as an officer of local civic groups.”151 Yet, this was insuffi-
cient to confer public-figure status upon Gertz. Other courts have followed 
Gertz’s lead in this respect. For example, in Bandelin, the court-appointed 
lawyer had been actively involved in the political and social affairs of his 
community, but, referencing Gertz, the Idaho Supreme Court declined to 
base its decision as to the lawyer’s public figure status exclusively on this 
fact.152 In other cases, however, the fact that a lawyer has attained notoriety 
by being a civic leader or actively involved in politics has played a strong 
role in the courts’ analysis.153 
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In many of the decisions to hold that the plaintiffs were public figures, 
the lawyers in question had previously held public office or been political 
candidates.154 This is generally consistent with the courts’ treatment of simi-
larly-situated individuals who were formerly public officials but retired to 
private life.155 Not all decisions fit this description, however. In one case, 
the plaintiff-lawyer was a Town Alderman.156 Rather than finding him to be 
a public official, however, the court found the lawyer to be a public figure 
based on his other community activities. Specifically, the lawyer was “a 
leader of the movement for the preservation of the Cajun culture and herit-
age in Louisiana, and he has acted as a spokesman for that cause on various 
occasions.”157 Therefore, he was a public figure for the limited purpose of a 
defamatory newspaper article involving him and Cajun culture.158 
3. Attaining Public Figure Status Through Media Interactions 
Although Gertz expressed reluctance about classifying a lawyer as a 
public figure based solely on the lawyer’s performance of his or her duties 
as a lawyer, the decision also suggests that a lawyer’s interactions with the 
media might lead to public figure status. In concluding that Gertz was not a 
limited-purpose public figure, the Court noted the fact that Gertz “never 
discussed either the criminal or civil litigation with the press and was never 
quoted as having done so.”159 The implication then is that a lawyer’s inter-
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action with the media may be a relevant factor in determining whether the 
lawyer thrust himself or herself to the forefront of the public controversy 
surrounding a client’s case in order to influence the resolution of the issues 
involved. 
Since Gertz, the courts have been less than clear as to how much me-
dia contact is enough to push a lawyer into the world of public figure status 
for purposes of defamatory statements concerning the lawyer’s involvement 
in a client matter. For example, in a decision from the United States District 
Court for the District of Hawaii, the court concluded that a court-appointed 
lawyer in a high-profile murder case was a limited-purpose public figure 
based on the fact that he had “actively sought exposure to the media and 
voluntarily maintained a high profile throughout the trial.”160 Notably, the 
court drew a line between media contact that is “necessary for the vigorous 
defense of [a] client” and media contact that is not and found the lawyer on 
the wrong side of that line.161 This, of course, begs an important question: 
when is contact with the media “necessary for the vigorous defense of [a] 
client?”162 Unfortunately, the court is less than precise in answering the 
question. The court provided no concrete examples. Instead, all the court 
tells us is that the lawyer “actively sought exposure to the media and volun-
tarily maintained a high profile throughout the trial” and that he “voluntari-
ly engaged in a course of action with respect to the trial that was bound to 
invite attention and comment.”163 
Unfortunately, no clear standard emerges from the decisions as to 
when a lawyer’s contact with the media transforms the lawyer into a public 
figure. Consenting to television and newspaper interviews during the course 
of representation has been held sufficient to render a lawyer a limited-
purpose public figure in some instances,164 but not others.165 In other cases, 
issuing press releases166 or responding to scattered requests for comment 
from the media related to a lawyer’s representation of a client167 was insuf-
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ficient to render the lawyers in question public figures. To the extent it is 
possible to discern any kind of meaningful standard from the decisions, a 
lawyer is likely to be classified as a public figure when the lawyer utilizes 
the media for, in the words of one court, “personal aggrandizement.”168 
4. Attaining Public Figure Status Through Courtroom Behavior or 
Misconduct 
There are a handful of decisions in which lawyers attained public fig-
ure status primarily by engaging in behavior in court that essentially invites 
media attention.169 For example, in a Michigan case, a court-appointed law-
yer in a criminal case had “excoriated the court repeatedly, and barraged the 
prosecutor and many witnesses with a steady stream of vitriol and invec-
tive.”170 He accused the judge and the prosecutor of collusion, called the 
prosecutor to the stand as a defense witness, “threatened to investigate all 
participants in the trial and subpoena their criminal records in response to 
what he deemed traducement by the court of his investigator,” and threat-
ened to put the judge on the stand and examine him about his “prior rec-
ord.”171 Eventually, the judge in the case questioned the lawyer’s sanity and 
appointed a psychiatrist to observe the lawyer.172 The local paper ran an 
editorial criticizing the lawyer’s behavior, which prompted the lawyer to 
sue for defamation.173 Relying upon Gertz’s assumption of risk rationale for 
classifying an individual as a limited-purpose public figure, the court con-
cluded that the lawyer, “by the manner in which he conducted himself in a 
public judicial proceeding, invited attention and comment.”174 
In contrast, other courts insist that a lawyer must have thrust them-
selves into a public controversy in an effort to influence its resolution be-
fore public figure status is appropriate; mere misconduct is insufficient.175 
In Littlefield v. Fort Dodge Messenger, a case from the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Eight Circuit, the attorney engaged in the practice of law while 
his license was suspended.176 A newspaper reported on the matter but mis-
stated some of the facts of the case.177 According to the Eighth Circuit 
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Court of Appeals, the lawyer may have engaged in the unauthorized prac-
tice of law, but “there is no indication that he did so out of a desire to influ-
ence any public controversy.”178 As such, he could not be a public figure.179 
5. Totality of the Circumstances 
In many cases—indeed, perhaps in most—courts do not base their de-
cisions as to an individual’s public-figure status solely on any one factor. 
Even in cases in which a lawyer’s representation of a high-profile client, 
media interactions, or some other factor influenced a court’s decision, there 
are often other factors that helped lead a court to the conclusion that a law-
yer was a public figure.180 Thus, many cases involve a totality of the cir-
cumstance analysis. 
For example, in a decision from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, 
Marcone v. Penthouse International Magazine for Men, the plaintiff-lawyer 
was defamed by an article stating that the lawyer was guilty of illegal drug 
activity when, in fact, he had only been charged with the crime and those 
charges had been dropped.181 Thus, one basis for concluding that the lawyer 
was a public figure was the fact that he had been charged with a crime.182 
Another was the fact that the lawyer frequently represented members of 
notorious motorcycle gangs who had been accused of illegal drug activi-
ties.183 A third was the fact that the lawyer associated with the members of 
one of those gangs outside of his professional duties.184 The Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals restated the general rule that legal representation of a cli-
ent, by itself, does not establish an individual as a public figure.185 Moreo-
ver, “if each element of the equation is taken separately it may be argued 
that no one aspect may be sufficient to create public figure status.”186 By 
considering all of the factors “in context and as a whole,” however, the 
court concluded that the lawyer had “crossed the line from private to limited 
purpose public figure.”187 Thus, the categories identified may combine in 
any number of ways—with each other or with other factors—to help lead to 
the determination that an individual qualifies as a public figure. 
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III. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S DEFAMATION 
JURISPRUDENCE AS ILLUSTRATED BY CASES INVOLVING  
LAWYERS AS PLAINTIFFS 
To some extent, the uncertainty surrounding the classification of law-
yers as public figures is representative of the broader uncertainty surround-
ing the test for determining the classification of individuals as public figures 
more generally. The considerations identified in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and its progeny have failed to pro-
duce consistent results on the issue of whether an individual qualifies as a 
public figure. Part of the uncertainty has to do with the fact that the Court 
has simply never articulated a clear test for determining public figure sta-
tus.188 The result is that courts often apply Gertz in unpredictable ways, 
sometimes leading to disparate results.189 
This article is certainly not the first piece of legal scholarship to point 
out the shortcomings of the Supreme Court’s defamation jurisprudence.190 
In order to fully appreciate why the lawyer-as-defamation-plaintiff cases 
have proven to be so difficult for courts, however, some further examination 
of the shortcomings of the Gertz line of cases is in order. Courts have inter-
preted Gertz in different ways, with some placing greater emphasis on par-
ticular facets of the decision than others.191 In any case involving the ques-
tion of whether an individual is a limited-purpose public figure, courts must 
consider two major issues: (1) whether a public controversy or public issue 
existed prior to the defamatory publication, and (2) the nature and extent of 
the plaintiff’s participation in the controversy or issue. Gertz and its proge-
ny have provided lower courts with sometimes confusing guidance on these 
issues. 
A. The Unclear Notion of “Public Controversies” 
One shortcoming of the U.S. Supreme Court’s New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan line of cases is the unclear meaning of the concepts of public issues 
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and public controversies. Gertz explains that, before one can be a limited-
purpose public figure, there must first be a public controversy into which 
the plaintiff entered.192 The Court, however, has not clearly defined this 
phrase.193 The result is uncertainty about how this threshold question will be 
resolved in any given case. 
1. Public Controversies and Matters of Public Concern 
a. Public Controversies 
In New York Times, the Court first spoke of the need to establish actual 
malice in the context of discussion of “public issues.”194 In subsequent cas-
es, however, the Court made clear that one did not become a public figure 
simply by being associated with a “public” or “newsworthy” issue.195 In-
stead, beginning with Gertz and continuing through the Court’s 1979 deci-
sion in Wolston v. Readers Digest Association, Inc., the Court gradually 
moved from the term “public issue” to the phrase “public controversy” to 
describe the relevant concept, resulting in terminology that suggests one 
becomes a limited-purpose public figure by thrusting oneself into the vortex 
of a “public controversy.”196 
Unfortunately, the Court failed to define the term in any meaningful 
way.197 The Wolston decision suggests that the Court originally viewed the 
term in an extremely narrow fashion.198 In Wolston, the Court questioned 
whether the plaintiff had thrust himself into any existing public controversy 
when he failed to respond to a subpoena for a hearing investigating Soviet 
espionage.199 In a footnote, the Court noted “there was no public controver-
sy or debate in 1958 about the desirability of permitting Soviet espionage in 
the United States; all responsible United States citizens understandably 
were and are opposed to it.”200 Because the Court decided the case on other 
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grounds, it never definitively decided what the public controversy in the 
case entailed.201 This passage, however, suggests a highly literal and restric-
tive view of the word “controversy”; a controversy exists only where there 
is an actual, ongoing debate among substantial portions of the public con-
cerning a specific issue.202 This footnote also hints at the Court’s desire to 
limit the scope of the public controversy concept.203 Surely, given the 
McCarthy hearings and the rise of the Cold War, there was “public contro-
versy or debate” over the extent and potential consequences of Soviet espi-
onage in 1958.204 Instead, the Court somewhat comically limited the con-
sideration to one of whether there was public controversy or debate con-
cerning the desirability of Soviet espionage and—not surprisingly—
discerned little public controversy over the issue.205 
As a result of the Court’s less-than-clear guidance, lower courts have 
struggled in applying this portion of the Court’s jurisprudence. Some lower 
courts have taken a similarly restrictive approach, focusing on the existence 
of an actual, live public dispute over a specific issue.206 For example, the 
Kentucky Supreme Court has held that the “‘nationwide controversy re-
garding recruitment of college athletes’ is too general a statement of a pub-
lic controversy.”207 Other courts have taken a more general approach, focus-
ing more on the existence of differing views on a general subject.208 
Courts have also struggled over the meaning of the word “public” in 
this context. There are several ways one could view the idea of a “public” 
controversy. A controversy could be “public” because large segments of the 
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public actually disagree about the issue.209 Alternatively, a controversy 
could be “public” insofar as it actually affects the public at large.210 
As a result of the Supreme Court’s lack of clarity, courts frequently 
differ in their articulation of the meaning of a “public controversy.”211 
b. Matters of Public Concern 
Complicating matters somewhat was the Supreme Court’s introduction 
of the concept of a “matter of public concern” into the defamation frame-
work. In the Court’s 1985 decision in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss 
Builders, Inc., the last case in which the Court has spoken at length on the 
public figure concept in defamation law, the Court did not analyze whether 
the speech in question concerned a public controversy.212 Instead, the Court 
chose to use the term “matter of public concern” in explaining why a pri-
vate-figure plaintiff who was defamed concerning a private matter did not, 
as a constitutional matter, have to establish even negligence, let alone actual 
malice, to prevail.213 In deciding the matter, the Court drew upon a long line 
of public employee free speech cases.214 
In its public employee free speech decisions, the Court has consistently 
spoken in terms of speech on matters of public concern.215 To be entitled to 
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First Amendment protection, a public employee must have spoken “as a 
citizen on a matter of public concern.”216 According to the Court, “[s]peech 
involves matters of public concern ‘when it can be fairly considered as re-
lating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, 
or when it is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of gen-
eral interest and of value and concern to the public.’”217 By the Court’s own 
admission, it has proven difficult to define precisely the concept of a matter 
of public concern.218 The Court’s decisions make clear that there need not 
be a public controversy before the matter is one of public concern. Instead, 
the focus is more on the importance or newsworthiness of the matter. This is 
significant insofar as years earlier, the Court had rejected the notion that the 
fact that a defendant’s speech involved newsworthy issues was sufficient to 
justify the use of the actual malice standard.219 
The fact that the Court in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. chose to incorporate 
its public employee speech jurisprudence and omit any reference to public 
controversies could be read as an attempt to settle on the public concern 
concept and to abandon the requirement of a public controversy.220 Indeed, 
in its subsequent defamation cases, the Court eschewed any mention of the 
public controversy concept and instead spoke of matters of public con-
cern.221 In line with this reading, some lower have focused on the question 
of whether the defamatory speech involved a matter of public concern.222 
Indeed, as recently as 2012, the Supreme Court has discussed the actual 
malice standard in terms of defamatory statements involving “matters of 
public concern.”223 
Some have argued that the Court’s defamation decisions should be read 
to suggest that the terms “public controversy” and “matter of public concern” 
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are intended to be kept separate and are terms of art.224 To the extent that a 
distinction exists between public controversies and matters of public concern, 
however, the distinction has sometimes been lost in practice as lower courts 
sometimes use the terms interchangeably.225 In fact, some courts have used 
the term “public controversy” but appear to define it in terms of newsworthi-
ness, such as the case in which a federal court stated the “public controversy” 
involved a contract dispute between a professional baseball player and his 
team.226 Others continue to utilize the public controversy nomenclature.227 
The fact that there is still uncertainty regarding a fundamental concept in 
the actual malice standard over fifty years after the Supreme Court first artic-
ulated that standard is fairly remarkable. If the public controversy and matter 
of public concern concepts are truly distinct concepts that serve independent 
functions, the Court has adopted an astonishingly convoluted rule in an al-
ready complex area of law with little, if any, attendant benefit. What seems 
more likely is that the Court has never fully settled on one standard, thus leav-
ing lower courts to navigate an uncertain course in this area. 
2. Public Controversies and Matters of Public Concern Involving Lawyers 
Cases involving lawyers and the legal process illustrate some of the 
confusion over the public controversy/matter of public concern issue. The 
Supreme Court’s 1976 holding in Time, Inc. v. Firestone that a high-profile 
divorce proceeding is not a public controversy under Gertz leaves open the 
question of what types of legal actions would qualify as public controver-
sies.228 It might be possible to justify the holding in Time, Inc. on the 
grounds that the public typically has only a limited and mostly prurient in-
terest in divorce proceedings. As one heads down the slippery slope away 
from divorce actions and toward other types of legal proceedings, however, 
it becomes virtually impossible to draw any kind of meaningful line as to 
what should qualify as a public controversy. 
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If part of the analysis involves consideration of whether members of 
the public will be affected by the resolution of a controversy, there are rela-
tively few legal proceedings that satisfy those criteria. The outcome of a 
legal proceeding involving the constitutionality of a health care law would 
certainly qualify, as might a court’s review of an agency’s regulations con-
cerning food labeling. Most legal proceedings, however, have little tangible 
impact on those beyond the immediate participants. To take an extreme ex-
ample, a high-profile murder trial may involve an actual dispute that cap-
tures public interest, but its resolution is unlikely to have ramifications in 
any significant sense on anyone beyond the immediate participants and their 
families. Yet, it seems inconceivable that a murder trial (or any felony case 
for that matter) that attracts public attention is not a public controversy. The 
fact that the judicial process is being utilized to enforce criminal law gives 
the public at least some interest in judicial proceedings. Any attempt to 
draw lines on the basis of whether other members of the public would feel 
the impact of the resolution of a particular proceeding ignores the reality 
that the public has a strong interest in knowing whether the legal system is 
operating in a fair and efficient manner. 
For example, in Marcone v. Penthouse International Magazine for 
Men, the defamatory statement involved a lawyer’s involvement in “the 
largest drug smuggling operation ever uncovered in the United States” at 
the time, an operation that ended up producing multiple indictments.229 In 
deciding whether the case involved a matter of public controversy, the Third 
Circuit focused on whether resolution of the drug trafficking criminal 
charges would affect the general public or some segment of it.230 Based on 
the fact that the drug trafficking ring was of “mammoth proportions,” the 
court had little difficulty concluding that the matter satisfied this stand-
ard.231 What if, however, the drug trafficking ring had operated on a more 
modest scale—would there still have been a public controversy? Life would 
go on as before for nearly every member of the public, regardless of the 
outcome of the case. Should that mean that the matter was still not of im-
portance to the public? Arguably, the more relevant consideration is the 
strength of the public’s interest in the enforcement of drug trafficking laws. 
This is perhaps why some courts take a broader view of the “public 
controversy” concept in the case of legal proceedings than Supreme Court 
precedent would suggest. For example, Street v. National Broadcasting Co., 
a case from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, involved a defamatory 
statement concerning the main witness in an infamous rape case from forty 
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years earlier.232 Few people outside the immediate participants in the rape 
trial could be expected to feel any effect as a result of the resolution of the 
controversy. Instead, the court held that the trials qualified as a public con-
troversy because they “were the focus of major public debate over the abil-
ity of our courts to render even-handed justice.”233 
In cases involving legal disputes and lawyers as plaintiffs, courts tend 
to take a similarly broad approach. In some cases, the legal dispute in ques-
tion could be expected to have an impact on the public at large or segments 
within a society and thus easily qualify as public controversies.234 At least 
as often, courts have focused more on the fact that the legal dispute raised 
important civics issues of general interest to the public. Thus, courts have 
routinely held that murder trials qualify as public controversies.235 In a case 
from the Supreme Court of Idaho, the “controversy” in which the lawyer 
became involved was a seemingly non-descript estate proceeding.236 The 
Michigan Court of Appeals has held that “a trial attorney is a public figure 
for purposes of comment on his conduct at trial,” thus necessarily implying 
that a trial—any trial—is a public controversy.237 
As is the case with defamation law more generally, some courts inquire 
not whether a public controversy existed but whether the plaintiff was in-
volved in a matter of public concern.238 For example, in case from the Court 
of Appeals of Mississippi, a newspaper published an article regarding pri-
vate accusations of unethical conduct on the part of a judge and identified 
the plaintiff-lawyer as having accused the judge of being a racist.239 It might 
have been difficult for the court to conclude that a public controversy exist-
ed regarding the alleged misconduct since the matter was only being dis-
cussed privately by municipal employees.240 Instead, the court stated that 
the question of whether the judge was unethical “was a matter of public 
concern” for the residents of the community.241 In other cases, courts have 
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similarly focused on the fact that the dispute or the lawyer’s involvement in 
a matter captured the public’s attention.242 
B. The Increasingly Outdated Nature of the Supreme Court’s  
Self-Help Rationale 
Part of the Supreme Court’s justification for requiring public figures to 
demonstrate actual malice is that public figures have “greater access to the 
channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic oppor-
tunity to counteract false statements than private individuals normally en-
joy.”243 This portion of the Court’s opinion from Gertz was written at a dif-
ferent time in American history. In 1974, most Americans received their 
news from one of three (maybe four) channels available on their television 
sets, local paper, or local radio stations.244 There was no such thing as social 
media, and personal home computers were still years away.245 If the average 
private individual was defamed in 1974, they had no realistic means to ef-
fectively state their own case and publicize the truth.246 Thus, the Court’s 
self-help rationale for public figure status was conceived at a time when 
most individuals lacked the ability to effectively counteract the sting of de-
famatory statements. 
As one author has observed, however, “[f]orty years of revolutionary 
technological change has dramatically reduced the force of this rationale for 
distinguishing public figures from private persons.”247 For example, accord-
ing to one estimate, 81% of Americans read a daily print newspaper at the 
time of the Court’s decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan in 1964; to-
day, less than 25% of Americans do.248 Instead, many individuals now rely 
upon the Internet and social media as their primary sources of news and 
information.249 More importantly, these tools have greatly increased the abil-
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ity of individuals to communicate their own views with others.250 According 
to one estimate, 73% of adults use social media in some form.251 Facebook, 
Twitter, and other social media platforms enable ordinary people to express 
themselves in ways and to a range of people that would have been inconceiv-
able to the members of the Court who decided Gertz in 1974.252 
To be sure, there are limits on the ability of a defamation victim to ef-
fectively counter the sting of defamation through the use of technological 
innovations. For one, the sheer amount of information Americans are rou-
tinely bombarded with may make it difficult for a defamation victim to cut 
through the clutter.253 For another, a blog post or Tweet from a non-celebrity 
is unlikely to command the type of attention that a traditional news confer-
ence or media interview with a celebrity might. Finally, there are still mil-
lions of Americans who do not have Internet access and who effectively 
lack channels of effective communication.254 
The reality, however, is that the majority of Americans have means of 
rebuttal that, while perhaps not as effective as those enjoyed by a true celeb-
rity, may still be effective in addressing defamation. At a minimum, most 
individuals have means of self-help that were simply unavailable to the av-
erage citizen in 1974. As such, technological advances have significantly 
undermined one of Gertz’s primary justifications for distinguishing between 
public and private figures in defamation cases.255 
C. Unclear Guidance as to the Voluntary Nature of the Plaintiff’s Conduct 
The Court has also provided unclear guidance regarding its voluntary-
assumption-of-risk justification for requiring public figures to establish actual 
malice on the part of defendants. In evaluating the nature and extent of an 
individual’s participation in a controversy, the Gertz Court emphasized the 
importance of the voluntariness of the plaintiff’s conduct. Gertz spoke of vol-
untariness in at least two different ways. In some passages, the Court speaks 
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of voluntariness in terms of voluntarily thrusting oneself into the spotlight for 
the purpose of influencing resolution of the existing controversy.256 In other 
passages, the Court focuses more on whether the defendant voluntarily en-
gaged in activity that increased the foreseeable risk of injury from a defama-
tory publication.257 This inconsistency has led to lower courts sometimes tak-
ing inconsistent approaches in general and in cases involving lawyers. 
1. Mounting the Rostrum vs. Assuming the Risk of Publicity 
For some courts, the primary focus is on whether the plaintiff (a) invit-
ed public attention to his or her views (b) in an effort to influence others on 
an issue.258 To these courts, a limited-purpose public figure is one who, in 
the words of Wolston, tries to “draw attention to himself in order 
to . . . influence the public with respect to any issue.”259 Under this view, the 
surest indication that an individual has invited public attention is when the 
individual seeks the limelight or “mounts a rostrum” in an effort to persuade 
others.260 This is perhaps the paradigmatic public-figure scenario.261 Courts 
adopting this interpretation of Gertz tend to place great weight on the plain-
tiff’s interactions with the media; the more the plaintiff seeks publicity for 
his or her views, the more likely it is the individual will be classified as a 
public figure.262 Some courts that follow this general approach place less 
emphasis on the plaintiff’s attempts to seek publicity and greater emphasis 
on the fact that the plaintiff was trying to influence the outcome of a mat-
ter.263 Such individuals have invited public comment on their actions.264 
Other courts view the concept of voluntary assumption of risk in a dif-
ferent manner. These courts are willing to assign public figure status even in 
the absence of voluntary attempts to grab the spotlight or occupy positions 
of special prominence. For these courts, the key question is whether the 
plaintiff voluntarily assumed a position that made it foreseeable that public 
attention would result. One who “voluntarily assumed a role of special 
prominence in the public controversy” could realistically expect that to have 
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an impact on the resolution of the matter. 265 An individual may also assume 
the risk of attention and defamatory comment through other forms of volun-
tary conduct where they could reasonably foresee that such conduct would 
result in public attention.266 Thus, as the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has 
explained, “the plaintiff’s action may itself invite comment and attention, 
and even though he does not directly try or even want to attract the public’s 
attention, he is deemed to have assumed the risk of such attention.”267 In the 
court’s words, such an individual must “accept the consequences of his de-
cision.”268 
2. Lawyers and Voluntary Conduct 
One can see these competing conceptions of Gertz’s voluntariness con-
sideration play out in the cases involving lawyers as plaintiffs. For some 
courts, the lawyer must “mount the rostrum” and attempt to shape the views 
of the public at large, typically through the use of the media, in order to 
qualify as a public figure.269 For other courts, however, the focus is on 
whether the lawyer voluntarily assumed a particularly visible position in the 
forefront of a public issue. If so, the lawyer impliedly invited comment and 
attention.270 For example, the fact that a lawyer agreed to represent a client 
in the face of existing or likely publicity concerning a legal matter might 
potentially lead to the conclusion that the lawyer “voluntarily” thrust herself 
into the vortex of a public issue.271 
Lawyers might also be said to voluntarily assume some risk of publici-
ty in another manner. By serving as the advocate for a client, a lawyer is 
quite literally “purposely trying to influence the outcome” of a controversy. 
To the extent the lawyer plays a major role in the matter and the matter is 
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truly a public one, the lawyer could perhaps be said to have voluntarily en-
gaged in activity that increased the foreseeable risk of injury from a de-
famatory publication. 
D. The Evolving Conception of Lawyer Interactions with the Media 
1. Gertz and Traditional Conceptions of Lawyer Interactions with the Media 
Gertz’s specific holding that Elmer Gertz was not a limited-purpose 
public figure was also based in part on the fact that Gertz never discussed 
the underlying case with the press nor was he quoted as having done so.272 
This, in the majority’s view, was evidence that Gertz had not thrust himself 
into the vortex of a public issue or engaged the public’s attention in an at-
tempt to influence the outcome of the issue.273 This portion of the Court’s 
holding suggests a narrow view of the proper role of a lawyer when it 
comes to communication with the public at large: the lawyer who represents 
a client in a controversial matter and who does not seek to communicate 
with the public concerning the matter is merely going about the business of 
being a lawyer and should not be deemed a public figure. In contrast, the 
lawyer who communicates with the public concerning the matter may have 
gone beyond the normal role of a lawyer and may be treated as a public fig-
ure. Since Gertz, lower courts have seized on this aspect of the decision and 
classified lawyers who disseminated information to the public concerning a 
particular matter as public figures.274 
Gertz was decided at a time when the legal profession took a dimmer 
view of publicity than it does today.275 When Gertz was decided, there were 
still states that prohibited lawyers from engaging in any type of advertis-
ing.276 At the time Gertz was decided, the American Bar Association’s 
(“ABA”) Model Code of Professional Responsibility permitted lawyers to 
advertise their services but placed significant limitations on the content of 
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those advertisements.277 The Model Code permitted lawyers to present 
twenty-five types of fairly mundane pieces of information, such as a law-
yer’s date and place of birth, schools attended, and bank references.278 This 
information could be publicized but with the important qualification that the 
information be presented “in a dignified manner.”279 Reflecting the age in 
which the Model Code was written, the advertising rules also spoke specifi-
cally only in terms of information “in print media” or television or radio 
broadcast and only permitted lawyers to advertise in the geographic area in 
which the lawyer or the lawyer’s clients were located.280 
2. Evolving Conceptions of Lawyer Interactions with the Media 
In 1977, the Supreme Court struck down on constitutional grounds a 
blanket ban on lawyer advertising in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.281 In de-
fense of the restriction, the Arizona Bar offered several justifications, in-
cluding the argument that lawyer advertising would have an adverse impact 
on professionalism by bringing about “commercialization,” which would 
“adversely affect the profession’s service orientation.”282 While commend-
ing “the spirit of public service with which the profession of law is prac-
ticed,” the Court opined that “the belief that lawyers are somehow ‘above’ 
trade has become an anachronism.”283 
Nearly forty years after Bates, law firms employ increasingly sophisti-
cated marketing techniques in an effort to increase name recognition, rang-
ing from increased social media presence to offering Groupon deals for le-
gal services.284 To be sure, there is still considerable disagreement regarding 
the desirability of advertising for legal services, but the legal profession is 
increasingly coming to the view that marketing legal services is a necessity 
in today’s marketplace.285 
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At the same time, the profession’s attitudes toward trial publicity have 
grown more liberal since Gertz. Throughout much of the twentieth century, 
the legal profession took a dim view of trial publicity. One of the earliest 
legal ethics codes advised that, as a general matter, “[n]ewspaper publica-
tions by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation . . . are to be con-
demned.”286 By the time of Gertz, the attitude of the profession toward pub-
licity had liberalized to some extent but remained extremely conservative. 
The ABA’s Model Code of Professional Responsibility) at the time prohibit-
ed lawyers associated with a civil action from making certain kinds of 
statements (such as the lawyer’s opinion as to the merits of a claim or de-
fense) that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means 
of public communication.287 Thus, the fact that the Court in Gertz consid-
ered Elmer Gertz’s avoidance of the media as a significant factor in its de-
termination of his public figure status was, to some extent, a product of the 
time.  
Gertz was decided at a time when trials generated significantly less 
public attention than they do today. To be sure, there have always been 
high-profile legal matters that have captured the public’s attention. But in 
today’s world courtroom proceedings have now become their own enter-
tainment genre. The Gertz Court could not have predicted that less than 
twenty years after its decision that an entire network, Court TV (now called 
TruTV), would spring up on cable television to provide nonstop and live 
coverage of trials.288 As a result, millions of viewers were able not just to 
read about, but to watch in real time, courtroom dramas such as the O.J. 
Simpson and Menendez Brothers trials.289 The public fascination with reali-
ty television that occurred soon thereafter only increased the tendency for 
traditional media to focus on court cases, and the explosion of the Internet 
and social media made it possible for millions of people to have access to 
the courtroom in a way they never had before. 
As Dean Erwin Chemerinsky has noted, with this increased public at-
tention on the legal system came “an increased demand for attorneys to talk 
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to the press.”290 The transformation in the public’s attention to legal matters 
necessarily has led the legal profession to reconsider its past hardline ap-
proach toward pretrial publicity. In 1991, the Supreme Court rejected the 
view that attorney communication with the press “somehow is inimical to 
the attorney’s proper role” and noted that attorneys may be valuable and 
reliable sources of information for the public in its understanding of the le-
gal process.291 ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6, which deals 
with trial publicity, now takes a more permissive approach to lawyer inter-
actions with the media than did the older Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility in effect at the time of Gertz.292 While the legal profession re-
mains somewhat divided on the subject of pretrial publicity, it cannot be 
disputed that there has at least been a thawing with respect to the older 
view. 
One school of thought continues to reflect the older view that lawyer 
speech on pending matters is pernicious and serves no purpose other than 
self-promotion.293 Professor Fred Zacharias summed up this view of lawyer 
speech on pending matters when he observed that lawyers “need not say 
anything to the press to represent their clients effectively.”294 On the other 
side of the divide are those who argue that effective representation may 
sometimes require contact with the media or, at a minimum, other efforts to 
help control public perceptions concerning a matter.295 For example, Pro-
fessor Margaret Tarkington has argued that in criminal cases, the prosecu-
tion has a natural advantage in terms of shaping pretrial publicity; simply by 
bringing charges against a defendant, a prosecutor is representing to the 
public that probable cause exists to believe the defendant committed the 
crime.296 Therefore, defense counsel should have greater latitude in terms of 
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pretrial publicity in order to offset this advantage and further the interest in 
justice.297 
Perhaps the most common argument in favor of permitting lawyers to 
speak more freely about legal matters is that such speech is sometimes nec-
essary to protect a client’s interests.298 One clear example of this view in-
volved the efforts of George Zimmerman’s legal team to influence public 
opinion during the investigation of and trial involving Zimmerman’s shoot-
ing of Trayvon Martin. Zimmerman’s lawyers took the unusual step of cre-
ating a website—George Zimmerman Legal Case299—prior to trial. In es-
tablishing the site, Zimmerman’s lawyers explained that social media is 
now “an unavoidable part of high-profile legal cases” and that “it would be 
irresponsible to ignore the robust online conversation.”300 Citing the wide-
spread public discussion surrounding the case, the defense team explained 
that establishing an online presence was necessary in order to address the 
misinformation that was being spread about Zimmerman and the case.301 
Zimmerman’s lawyers used the site to post public documents related to the 
case.302 Zimmerman’s lawyers also went beyond establishing the website. 
Mark O’Meara, one of Zimmerman’s attorneys, became a familiar figure 
leading up to trial as he frequently appeared on television talk shows and 
held news conferences in which he discussed the case and his client’s state 
of mind.303 
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The Zimmerman case is perhaps an extreme example in terms of cases 
generating public discussion and a lawyer’s use of social media. But as the 
public’s ability to follow legal cases in real time increases, the arguments in 
favor of permitting lawyers to speak out publicly on behalf of their clients 
at least resonate more strongly than they did when Gertz was decided. Alt-
hough it is perhaps a stretch to suggest that it is common and often neces-
sary for lawyers to speak to the press or make use of social media in the 
course of representing a client, it has certainly become more common to do 
so. Thus, the Court’s suggestion in Gertz that speaking to the media is not 
part of a lawyer’s normal duties seemed perfectly reasonable at the time, but 
the force of that suggestion has been weakened in the ensuing four decades. 
E. The Failure of the Supreme Court to Recognize the Special  
Role of Lawyers 
Perhaps the most noteworthy shortcoming of the Gertz decision as it 
applies specifically to lawyers is the short shrift the Court gave to the fact 
that Elmer Gertz was a lawyer. The Court’s entire New York Times line of 
cases is inconsistent in its treatment of how an individual’s status or chosen 
profession impacts the public official/public figure analysis. The decisions 
to classify the plaintiffs in Gertz and Wolston as private figures are premised 
mainly on the fact that neither party voluntarily thrust himself into the pub-
lic spotlight in an attempt to shape public discussion. Simply attaining noto-
riety in connection with a public controversy was insufficient to confer pub-
lic figure status.304 In other decisions, the Court and lower courts have at-
tached considerably more weight to a plaintiff’s status alone or the nature of 
the plaintiff’s profession in considering public figure status. 
1. The Public Official Cases 
In its decisions addressing whether an individual qualifies as a public 
official, the Court has focused almost exclusively on the nature of the plain-
tiff’s job. The Court’s decision in New York Times devoted little attention to 
the self-help and assumption of risk justifications that later appeared in 
Gertz to justify requiring public officials to establish actual malice on the 
plaintiff’s part. Instead, the Court rested its decision largely on the fact that 
the roles that public officials occupy are sufficiently important to society 
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1584 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:1543 
that permitting liability to attach for merely negligent criticisms of the per-
formance of their duties would deter discussion of vital public concern.305  
Two years later in 1966, in Rosenblatt v. Baer, the Court again focused 
on the importance of a public employee’s position in deciding whether they 
qualified as a public official. To qualify as a public official for New York 
Times actual malice purposes, according to the Court, the employee’s position 
must have “such apparent importance that the public has an independent in-
terest in the qualifications and performance of the person who holds it, be-
yond the general public interest in the qualifications and performance of all 
government employees.”306 Public officials include “those persons who are in 
a position significantly to influence the resolution of . . . [public] issues.”307 
To a limited extent, these decisions are rooted in the assumption of risk 
justification explicated in Gertz. Rosenblatt explained that to qualify as a 
public official for purposes of New York Times actual malice analysis, “[t]he 
employee’s position must be one which would invite public scrutiny and 
discussion of the person holding it, entirely apart from the scrutiny and dis-
cussion occasioned by the particular charges in controversy.”308 Thus, one 
who voluntarily assumes certain public positions also assumes the risk of 
public scrutiny and discussion. But the opinions are also rooted in the sim-
ple idea that the nature of a public official’s job invites and is a legitimate 
topic of public discussion. 
2. The Public Figure Cases 
There is more than a hint of this same approach in the Court’s public 
figure cases as well. Gertz indicates that a limited-purpose public figure is 
almost always one who actively seeks to engage the public’s attention.309 
But this is not necessarily true for the all-purpose or general-purpose public 
figure. The all-purpose public figure may not have been trying to engage 
the public’s attention, let alone trying to influence resolution of any kind of 
public controversy. As Gertz explains, it is enough that one, through “noto-
riety of their achievements,” has attained “pervasive fame or notoriety.”310 
Lower courts have followed this approach. In short, status alone is sufficient 
to render one an all-purpose public figure. 
This same theme appears in the Court’s first decision extending the ac-
tual malice standard to public figures as well as public officials. In 1967, in 
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, the Court decided a public figure issue in-
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volving two separate plaintiffs: Edwin A. Walker, a private individual, who 
had been outspoken and had received public attention on the issue of federal 
intervention in civil rights matters, and Wallace Butts, the athletic director 
at the University of Georgia, who was accused of having helped fix a col-
lege football game.311 Foreshadowing the concept of a limited-purpose pub-
lic figure, the Court observed that Walker qualified as a public figure “by 
his purposeful activity amounting to a thrusting of his personality into the 
‘vortex’ of an important public controversy.”312 Butts, in contrast, attained 
public figure status “by position alone.”313 In this respect, the Court’s treat-
ment of this type of public figure in Butts is quite similar to its treatment of 
public officials in New York Times. 
Although the Court’s subsequent decisions in Gertz and Wolston shied 
away from the idea that one can become a limited-purpose public figure by 
notoriety alone,314 lower courts have often been willing to classify an indi-
vidual as a limited-purpose public figure based on notoriety attained by en-
gaging in an occupation or profession that invites public attention and 
comment.315 The clearest example of this is in cases involving athletes. For 
example, in Barry v. Time, Inc., a federal court in California articulated the 
view that by accepting certain jobs, an individual invites attention and 
comment.316 If attention and comment then follow that individual, they may 
be treated as a public figure.317 In Barry, the plaintiff was a college basket-
ball coach who accepted the job at a time when there was an ongoing con-
troversy as to alleged recruiting violations at the college.318 In the court’s 
view, the decision to accept the job under these circumstances amounted to 
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sufficient “thrusting” under Gertz to justify public figure status.319 The court 
went further and noted that there was a “long line” of cases, dating back to 
Butts, finding professional and college athletes and coaches to be public 
figures.320 From these cases, the court observed a common thread: “one’s 
voluntary decision to pursue a career in sports, whether as an athlete or a 
coach, ‘invites attention and comment’ regarding his job performance and 
thus constitutes an assumption of the risk of negative publicity.”321 
Indeed, the Barry court is correct in its observation. For example, in a 
post-Gertz decision, a Pennsylvania federal court made the following ob-
servation in a case involving a professional athlete: 
Where a person has, however, chosen to engage in a profession 
which draws him regularly into regional and national view and 
leads to ‘fame and notoriety in the community,’ even if he has no 
ideological thesis to promulgate, he invites general public discus-
sion . . . . If society chooses to direct massive public attention to a 
particular sphere of activity, those who enter that sphere inviting 
such attention must overcome the Times standard.322 
The Third Circuit later affirmed, concluding that “[p]rofessional athletes, at 
least as to their playing careers, generally assume a position of public prom-
inence” and that the plaintiff, a professional football player, was a public 
figure.323 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has advanced a similar 
theme. In Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., the D.C. Circuit Court 
observed that “[s]ometimes position alone can make one a public figure.”324 
There may also be situations, however, in which the responsibilities of an 
individual’s position are sufficiently important that the individual becomes a 
public figure. The court in Waldbaum pointed out that an individual may be 
a limited public figure if their position requires them to make decisions that 
will have a significant impact on public controversies.325 
The idea that one may become a public figure just on the basis of one’s 
status rather than any attempt to court fame has also been applied to law-
yers. In one federal district court case from Maryland, a lawyer had held 
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“high-profile positions, including serving as counsel to the World Bank and 
to the Government of Nigeria in several high profile cases” and had com-
peted “at the highest echelon of the legal profession worldwide.”326 Based 
on these facts, the court concluded that the lawyer was a public figure de-
spite the lack of any evidence that he had thrust himself into the spotlight 
for the purpose of influencing resolution of any existing controversy.327 
3. The Public Nature of the Legal Profession 
Ample authority existed at the time of Gertz for the Supreme Court to 
have factored into its analysis the fact that Elmer Gertz was a lawyer, a po-
sition that at least in some instances invites public attention and com-
ment.328 Moreover, the fact that Gertz was a lawyer who had voluntarily 
accepted employment in connection with an ongoing public controversy 
might also have been a relevant consideration for the Court. Finally, the fact 
that Gertz had decision-making responsibility for the representation of the 
family in its wrongful death suit and thus could potentially influence the 
resolution of the matter would also seem to have been a relevant considera-
tion in deciding whether Gertz had assumed the risk of resulting publicity. 
For whatever reason, however, the Court did not overtly take these realities 
into account. 
This failure represents an odd omission from the Court’s opinion. The 
legal profession has long viewed its members as occupying a special role 
within society. At the time Gertz was decided, the Preamble to the ABA’s 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility) boldly proclaimed, “Lawyers, 
as guardians of the law, play a vital role in the preservation of society.”329 
The Preamble to the ABA’s current Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
observes that “[a] lawyer . . . is a representative of clients, an officer of the 
legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quali-
ty of justice.”330 The job of a lawyer is often a public one. By choosing to 
become a lawyer, a person has chosen to engage in a profession that may 
sometimes draw the lawyer into the public arena and which, by definition, 
often involves disputes in which the public has a strong interest. This is 
more likely to be true in the case of litigators, whose job requires them to 
enter public courtrooms in order to help influence the resolution of disputes, 
than transactional lawyers. But even transactional lawyers, however, are 
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“public citizens” who use the machinery of the law to advance their client’s 
interests. 
As public citizens with special obligations with respect to the quality 
of justice, lawyers may have special obligations more generally with respect 
to the legal system. As explained by the Supreme Court of Michigan, “the 
law has reposed special stewardship duties on lawyers on the basis of the 
venerable notion that lawyers are more than merely advocates who happen 
to carry out their duties in a courtroom environment, they are also officers 
of the court.”331 Given the public’s strong interest in the efficient operation 
of the justice system, the public has a greater interest in being informed of 
and regulating the behavior of members of the legal profession than it does 
with other professions. For instance, courts are generally more willing in 
the case of lawyers than other occupations to invalidate contracts that vio-
late rules of professional conduct on the grounds that such contracts offend 
public policy.332 Further, in upholding special restrictions on the ability of 
lawyers to criticize judges, some courts have expressed the view that such 
restrictions are justified because lawyers occupy a special role as officers of 
the court and their views regarding the legal system are afforded greater 
credibility by the public.333 In short, the law sometimes treats lawyers dif-
ferently because of the public function lawyers serve. 
Therefore, it is somewhat surprising, given the Court’s earlier empha-
sis on status and position in New York Times and Butts, that Gertz’s status as 
a lawyer played no obvious role in the Court’s decision-making process in 
Gertz on the question of public figure status. 
IV. LAWYERS AS PUBLIC FIGURES 
Cases involving lawyers as defamation plaintiffs illustrate the numer-
ous shortcomings of the Supreme Court’s New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 
line of cases. The lack of clarity and shifting focus in the decision has re-
sulted in confusion and misclassification in some instances. In a perfect 
world, the Court would start from scratch and adopt a uniform standard that 
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does not rely on arguably unworkable distinctions between public and pri-
vate figures.334 Assuming this is unlikely to happen, lower courts could still 
provide some much needed clarification and revision to the law in the area in 
a manner that is consistent with the spirit of Supreme Court decisions. Cases 
involving lawyers as defamation plaintiffs provide a useful tool for doing so. 
In the process, lower courts could also provide some much needed guidance 
for future litigants in defamation cases involving lawyers as plaintiffs. 
A. Loosening the Restrictions of the Gertz Categories 
Currently, many courts view Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. as establishing 
only two categories of public figures: all-purpose public figures who have 
attained extensive fame and notoriety and limited-purpose public figures 
who have thrust themselves into the vortex of a pre-existing public contro-
versy in order to influence resolution of that controversy. Some are at least 
willing to recognize the possibility that the “rare” individual might qualify 
as a public figure through no purposeful action of her own. But the result is 
that courts sometimes fail to classify individuals as public figures who logi-
cally should qualify. 
All too often, lower courts’ engagement in an excessively formalistic 
reading of Gertz and its progeny has detracted from the central message of 
New York Times that debate on public issues should be uninhibited.335 This 
has resulted in such pointless semantic discussions as whether a matter of 
ongoing public debate is a “public controversy” or merely a public issue or 
matter of public concern. Nowhere is this more evident than in the decision 
of many courts to establish two (or at best three) rigid categories of public 
figures. The Gertz Court was clear, however, that it was not announcing a 
rigid set of public figure categories but was instead “lay[ing] down broad 
rules of general application.”336 As one author has noted, “the Gertz proto-
types do not freeze the law; they are useful examples, stimulants to 
thought . . . .”337 In fact, New York Times, Butts, and Gertz all provide suffi-
cient authority for the recognition of at least one other type of public figure: 
those whose occupations or professions necessarily create a foreseeable 
likelihood of resulting notoriety.338 This category would often include ath-
letes, entertainers, and—notably—lawyers.339 
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New York Times and Butts both provide support for the position that 
some individuals occupy positions that may foreseeably lead to notoriety 
and public comment.340 Gertz justifies imposing the burden on public fig-
ures to establish actual malice largely on assumption of risk grounds. While 
Gertz’s “access to channels of effective communication” rationale has been 
substantially weakened over time, the assumption of risk rationale—the 
“more important” of the two rationales—still retains some force.341 Logical-
ly, then, it stands to reason that some individuals can be said to have as-
sumed the risk of notoriety and public comment by virtue of the occupation 
or profession they have chosen to enter and should therefore be required to 
establish actual malice. 
If a court were inclined to define this category of individuals narrowly, 
it could be defined so that it largely tracks the public official category. At a 
minimum, an individual may be a public figure where the individual’s cho-
sen field places the individual in a position to significantly influence the 
resolution of public issues.342 The category would also include those whose 
chosen fields place them in a position of such apparent importance that the 
public has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of 
the people who hold them.343 
Admittedly, this standard has its own ambiguity issues.344 However, 
there are meaningful markers to guide a court’s analysis. Where a court’s 
focus is on the existence of a matter of public concern (as opposed to a pub-
lic controversy), the question is often about whether the public has a special 
interest in the plaintiff’s activities that are the subject of the defamatory 
statement. For example, restaurants and other places of public accommoda-
tions are often classified as public figures for purposes of statements con-
cerning the services they provide because restaurants actively seek public 
patrons and offer services to the public at large.345 In support of this conclu-
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sion, courts have cited the strong interest the public has in consumer report-
ing on the services provided by entities that provide goods and services to 
the public.346 As explained by one court, “by its nature, consumer reporting 
involves matters of particular interest to the public.”347 
Some courts have also cited the fact that a business is subject to exten-
sive government regulation in support of the conclusion that the public has 
a particular interest in the affairs of the business, and the business is, there-
fore, a public figure for defamation purposes.348 Under this approach, the 
fact that an entity, such as an insurance company, is subject to close regula-
tion by the state is evidence that that the entity invites public attention and 
comment.349 
Along those same lines, numerous state statutes declare it to be a matter 
of public concern that only qualified individuals be permitted to engage in 
various professions and practices. These professions and practices include 
optometry, dentistry, pharmacy, architecture, and cosmetology.350 These stat-
utes also frequently explain that it is a matter of public concern that these 
practices and professions enjoy the confidence of the public.351 
Of course, unlike the legal profession, these are all professions and 
practices that are heavily regulated by state legislatures. As the next section 
discusses in more detail, however, the analogies to the legal profession are 
still hard to avoid. 
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Alternatively, a court could choose to define the category in a slightly 
more expansive manner to include those whose chosen occupations or pro-
fessions make it foreseeable that publicity and public comment may result, 
such as the Athletic Director at the University of Georgia in Butts.352 To the 
extent there needs to be a limiting principle, individuals could be classified 
as public figures only for purposes of defamatory statements having some 
clear connection or relevance to their occupations or position, à la the ath-
letic director being accused of fixing a game. Regardless of the precise for-
mulation, the result would be a more meaningful way of resolving the pub-
lic figure question.  
B. Lawyers as Public Figures 
Lawyers provide a clear example of the benefits of and justifications 
for such an approach. Some lawyers should be classified as limited-purpose 
public figures with little difficulty even under Gertz’s restrictive category. 
The most obvious examples are cause lawyers. For some lawyers, engaging 
in a legal dispute is a means of political expression.353 For these lawyers, 
litigation is undertaken for the purpose of advancing their particular caus-
es.354 Therefore, cause lawyers, lawyers for whom the legal process is a 
means of advancing a particular cause, mount the rostrum in a public man-
ner and should ordinarily be classified as public figures to the extent they 
play a significant role in a public controversy.355 
But even the average lawyer who becomes the subject of significant 
public attention through the performance of their duties or in their profes-
sional capacity should ordinarily be treated as a public figure. The legal 
profession routinely posits that lawyers are public citizens “having special 
responsibility for the quality of justice.”356 Indeed, the notion of the “citi-
zen-lawyer” or “lawyer-statesman” has deep roots in American history. 
As Dean Davison Douglas has detailed, when Thomas Jefferson con-
ceived of the first legal education curriculum in the United States, his goal 
was “to educate a group of ‘public citizens’—those who would place public 
interest ahead of private interest and exercise leadership in preserving re-
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publicanism.”357 Jefferson believed it was necessary to instill in aspiring 
lawyers “public virtue,” defined as “[t]he sacrifice of individual interests to 
the greater good of the whole.”358 Jefferson’s vision was widely adopted at 
the time, as evidenced, in part, by the large number of lawyers who served 
as elected officials during the first half of the nineteenth century.359 
It would obviously be a gross oversimplification to argue that the U.S. 
legal profession has always and forever consisted of an army of public citi-
zens seeking to serve broader societal needs. The idea of the lawyer as oc-
cupying a public rolelooms large in the history of the legal profession, how-
ever. For much of the twentieth century, the dominant conception of the 
lawyer was as one who was “simultaneously a zealous representative of 
clients and a guardian of the public good.”360 As described by Professor 
Russell G. Pearce, this “Professionalism Paradigm” was based “on a pur-
ported bargain between the profession and society in which the profession 
agreed to act for the good of clients and society in exchange for autono-
my.”361 Under this conception of what it means to be a lawyer, “lawyers 
altruistically place the good of their clients and the good of society above 
their own self-interest.”362 
This conception of lawyers as “guardians of the public good”363 might 
manifest itself in a number of ways. Lawyers might fulfill their obligations 
as public citizens by assuming leadership roles within the community and at 
large.364 For example, Professor Deborah Rhode and others have written 
extensively about the concept of lawyers as leaders and the various ways in 
which lawyers serve as leaders in society.365 Lawyers might also take on a 
public role by engaging in public service. According to Woodrow Wilson, 
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“public life was a lawyer’s forum” and the practice of law imposed upon a 
lawyer an obligation to “shape matters of public concern.”366 Thus, “It was 
not uncommon for elite lawyers in the first half of the twentieth century to 
shuttle between high-level government positions in Washington, D.C. and 
private law practice in Wall Street’s large firms.”367 
Lawyers may also fulfill their end of the bargain as part of the profes-
sionalism paradigm by helping to ensure that members of the public are not 
denied access to justice. In exchange for the freedom from external regula-
tion and its monopoly on the practice of law, lawyers may satisfy their obli-
gations to the public by being willing to help ensure access to justice.368 
This obviously could entail providing pro bono services, but it might also 
involve being willing to represent unpopular clients.369 The Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct advise that a lawyer has an ethical obligation to ac-
cept “a fair share of unpopular matters or indigent or unpopular clients.”370 
Summing up the idea of a lawyer as public citizen, John Adams famously 
observed that his representation of the British soldiers involved in the Bos-
ton Massacre was “one of the best Pieces of Service I ever rendered my 
Country.”371 In short, if lawyers insist on calling themselves public citizens 
and claiming the benefits of that title, they should also be willing to accept 
the burdens that go along with that title. 
Even those lawyers who view the practice of law more as a business 
than a calling or who do not accept the professionalism paradigm must con-
cede that the public has a strong interest in the qualifications and integrity 
of lawyers. The public unquestionably also has a particular interest in being 
informed of judicial proceedings and a legitimate interest in being informed 
about how the state-sanctioned legal process operates.372 This is a theme 
that runs throughout the unauthorized practice of law and professional dis-
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cipline cases involving lawyers.373 Additionally, the public has an equally 
strong interest in the effective administration of justice.374 As public citizens 
with special obligations with respect to the quality of justice, lawyers obvi-
ously play a vital role in that process. Classifying lawyers as public figures 
where the performance of their duties results in public attention and com-
ment would be consistent both with furthering the public interest in keeping 
informed about the legal system as well as the legal profession’s view of 
itself and its proffered justifications for self-regulation.  
The assumption of risk justification offered in Gertz for requiring pub-
lic figures to prove actual malice further supports classifying lawyers as 
public figures. Given the realities of modern society and law practice, law-
yers can reasonably foresee that their professional endeavors may result in 
significant public attention and comment. Sometimes, the attention and 
comment might result from a lawyer’s successes or failures. Other times, it 
might result from a lawyer’s involvement in a high-profile matter. Modern 
lawyers can also be expected to foresee that their representation of a client 
may require them to interact with the public in a manner inconceivable to 
lawyers fifty years ago. Gone also are the days when the average lawyer 
could develop a client base simply by doing a good job. Marketing is now 
seen as a necessity for many law firms, and, through their advertisements 
and social media marketing, more and more lawyers have willingly sought 
to engage the public’s attention. 
Even lawyers who are appointed in a matter could be argued to have 
assumed the risk of resulting publicity stemming from the matter. Courts 
have long claimed the inherent authority to appoint lawyers in court mat-
ters.375 Rule 6.2 of the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohib-
its a lawyer from seeking to avoid a court appointment without good 
cause.376 Therefore, the nature of an attorney’s role creates at least some 
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potential for an attorney to make their way into court and into the public 
eye. 
Moreover, the state has an especially strong interest in establishing def-
amation rules that do not deter discussion of the legal system and those who 
play crucial roles within that system. The public has an undeniably strong 
interest in information pertaining to the legal system.377 This also clearly in-
cludes an interest in discussing the qualifications and performance of those 
charged with special responsibility for the quality of justice.378 These are mat-
ters of considerable importance to the public, as evidenced by the elaborative 
set of professional conduct rules and enforcement procedures designed to 
protect the public from incompetent and unethical lawyers. 
The state has a particularly strong interest in the free flow of infor-
mation relating to a lawyer’s qualifications or performance in an age in 
which such information is routinely disseminated. Law offices are places of 
public accommodation that offer legal services to the public.379 Lawyers 
also now routinely market their services to the public, and there are any 
number of online lawyer rating services through which clients can provide 
and learn information about a lawyer’s services. Extending the protection 
afforded by the actual malice test to consumer information concerning law-
yers furthers the state’s strong interest in the dissemination of information 
relating to services provided by places of public accommodation. Given the 
public’s strong interest in making informed decisions with respect to choice 
of counsel, there is no compelling justification for allowing the determina-
tion of what legal standard should apply to hinge on the inconsequential 
consideration of whether there was an ongoing “public controversy” when 
the defamatory statement was made. 
There remains the concern raised by some courts that increasing the 
number of instances in which lawyers are subject to the actual malice stand-
ard might dissuade lawyers from agreeing to represent clients in difficult, 
unpopular, high profile, or sensational types of cases.380 The realities of 
modern communication methods and modern law practice undermine the 
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strength of this concern. The Internet, social media, and other forms of me-
dia now make it possible for even seemingly trivial matters to “go viral” 
and produce unwanted public attention. As a logical matter, the risk of un-
wanted attention and publicity would seem to be a greater deterrent to a 
lawyer taking on an unpopular client than the hypothetical and, frankly, re-
mote possibility that the representation will produce a defamation claim that 
would be worth pursuing. In addition, the arguments underlying the profes-
sionalism paradigm and the assumption of risk arguments advanced in this 
Article also undermine the concerns over extending the actual malice stand-
ard. Lawyers who enter the profession today do so knowing that providing 
access to justice is a part of their professional responsibilities and that the 
public has a strong interest in the fair administration of justice. Having to 
establish that a defendant knew a statement was false or acted in reckless 
disregard of the truth or falsity of a statement seems a small burden to en-
dure in exchange for the benefits and freedom from external regulation that 
lawyers enjoy. 
Ultimately, classifying lawyers as public figures for purposes of de-
famatory statements having some clear connection or relevance to their pro-
fession would be consistent with the goal of encouraging public discussion 
of the legal process and the legal profession’s own public statements about 
the profession. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s line of defamation cases beginning with New 
York Times v. Sullivan have left lower courts with a confusing and some-
times contradictory set of standards to follow. At the same time, courts have 
long struggled with the question of whether ordinary legal principles should 
apply to lawyers or whether special lawyer-specific standards should ap-
ply.381 These two realities have collided in defamation cases involving law-
yers as plaintiffs, and the results have been about what one might expect. 
But by reviving the Supreme Court’s early pronouncements on the subject 
of defamation law and giving full recognition to the legal profession’s pro-
fessed views of itself and the realities of modern practice, courts can devel-
op more consistent and logical principles, both in general and in the special 
case of lawyers as plaintiffs. 
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